Stavros Lygeros: What was discussed at the teleconference of the Ministers of Defense – Why the EU will not have a common defense policy

The EU Defense Ministers’ teleconference on 20 November focused on the strategic review of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation for European Security), established by the Treaty of Lisbon. According to absolutely valid information, this was one thing that did not happen during the teleconference.

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borel was one of the two factors that “derailed” the teleconference, due to the fact that he went too far and with his interventions did not allow an organized discussion, among other issues, on Turkey’s role in Libya. But there was no substantial exchange of views on any other issue either.

The second factor was the well-known incident with the Dutch journalist who infiltrated the teleconference, causing chaos and a climate of disintegration. He succeeded because he used the code of the Dutch Minister of Defense, which appeared in the photo he published via tweet.

On the other hand, the whole debate between the defense ministers reaffirmed the lack of a common understanding of the threats and priorities that the EU must have in the field of security and defense. The French minister extensively analyzed the military situation in Mali and asked for the assistance of the member states participating in PESCO (Denmark, Malta and of course Britain do not participate).

Greece, Estonia, which has already sent troops, and Germany responded to the French request. The action of the European force against the jihadists will be extended from Mali to Burkina Faso, which is also being tested.

“Operation IRINI”

Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panayotopoulos, however, referred in detail to “Operation IRINI”, whose main goal, as is well known, is to oversee the implementation of the arms embargo decided by the UN Security Council for the warring parties in Libya. It is now anticipated that the suspected ships will be driven to the port of Marseille provided by France for investigation there.

“Operation IRINI” caused France and more recently Germany to come into conflict with Turkey. We note that months ago a Turkish warship had “locked” its weapon systems on a French frigate, which had asked a Turkish cargo ship to stop for an investigation. A few days ago, a German frigate attempted to search the Turkish cargo ship “Rozalin”, which was not accompanied by warships, but the search was not completed, because Ankara intervened.

It is clear that the observance of the arms embargo on the warring parties in Libya is crucial not only for the negotiation process for a political solution, but also for the destabilizing presence of Turkey in this African country, which in a sense lies in the soft underbelly of Greece and therefore concerns its national security.

The strategic review of PESCO

As has emerged from the interventions of the Ministers of Defense for the strategic review of PESCO, the differences within the EU as to what the threats it faces are unbridgeable. Therefore, there is an obvious impossibility to formulate a European defense doctrine, or at least a compass for European defense and security policy.

A typical example is the attitude of Poland, which insisted that Russia is not only a hybrid threat, but also a direct threat to its territorial sovereignty. Therefore, according to Warsaw, PESCO should be in line with NATO’s strategic doctrine. In other words, indirectly but clearly, this position nullifies the need for an autonomous European defense and security strategy, as sought by President Macron, among others.

It is noteworthy that this is not only the view of Poland, but more or less the other countries of Eastern Europe, but also of Scandinavia. This has a critical impact on Hellenism. Since the threat is Russia and the mechanism to deal with it is essentially NATO, Turkey can not be a threat to Europe, although it is a direct and proven threat to two member states, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. Consequently, there is no room for substantial sanctions. At most some rhetorical criticisms and of course recommendations for dialogue with the logic “do not bother us”!

The conference call, however, generally confirmed that in the critical area of ​​defense and security, the EU could not take a step towards a common European policy. Member States approach the problem through the prism of national perspectives and priorities, without any inclination to look for a common denominator. This practically means that the existing chaos of views is structural and not conjunctural, which makes it impossible to converge on a common European strategic vision.