The informal EU Council of Foreign Ministers met for two days, on 27 and 28 August. As is the case at every recent meeting of the EU institutions, Athens had pinned many hopes on it, expecting some substantial step, some collective response to the attack against two EU member states, Cyprus and Greece.
The result was what, based on the experience of countless similar cases in the past, everyone expected. There was some discussion, the partners unanimously expressed their solidarity and sympathy, some vague ideas for measures were heard - one could hardly call them sanctions - and then, in the following statements, the need for dialogue between Greece and Turkey on their differences was stressed, in general, and on the "disputed" waters of the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. In short, the usual.
What, although it tends to become commonplace, is still annoying is that, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus expressed his disappointment with the result of this meeting, Greek Foreign Minister Dendias hastened to express his satisfaction for the same result. It should be recalled that the latter was the one who dramatized - as was logical after weeks of research on the potential Greek continental shelf accompanied by a large part of the Turkish fleet – Greek demands, talking about the "absolute necessity" of the sanctions framework.
The reason why he was pleased to postpone the debate on the already ridiculous sanctions, proposed for a month later, remains unknown. In a month, after all, another "priority" of the Belarusian type will shift the issue for later. The successive enthusiasms of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the Greek government as a whole and of the press (printed and electronic) dedicated to buttering up the current rulers, are refuted by reality.
Mini war under international supervision
Stubbornly, after every expression of solidarity and sympathy, the allies, partners and desirable "protectors" of our country recommend "to find things" with Turkey, to de-escalate and to enter into discussions with a vague framework. So vague that it refers to the universal negotiating framework that Turkey wants, starting with the borders and their "unfortunate" definition in 1923 or 1947.
In this suffocating context, the enthusiasm and the official expressions of satisfaction from the Greek side simply open the next chapter of the drama, bringing closer either capitulation, or war, as a means to “sell” the capitulation to the Greek people. Without wanting to become soothsayers, we might have assumed that in front of the impasse that now suffocates Greek politics, a "war under international supervision," in essence, a mini-war might be a welcome way out for Greek political elites and the ruling class. After that they could freely negotiate many more things than they might haave been able before it.
Greece has political weapons
In other circumstances it would be unnecessary to recall the obvious and self-evident, meaning, what Greece could claim in the diplomatic field and what weapons it has in this field. In the current circumstances, where the Greek side (prime minister, foreign minister and all of the political leadership) wanders around like a beggar, it makes sense to list what could be a national policy towards allies and partners. Let's look at these:
The Greek side could make it clear that the status of facilities and concessions to NATO and the US will be conditional if the Alliance and the great "leading power" do not fulfill the political and - if you will - moral responsibility to Greece. That is, if they leave it alone against the conspiracies of the other "ally".
The Greek side could make it clear that in the event of a loss of sovereignty or territory, Greece would reconsider its relations with allies, alliances and partners who cannot or do not want to secure what is necessary: its security.
The Greek side could make it clear that in case the allies and partners do not respect the letter and the spirit of the agreements and do not honor their obligations to Greece - as Greece has honored all the obligations within NATO and the EU - then Greece will turn in other directions to gain the diplomatic and allied support it needs against an attacking state.
The West needs Greece
And because the begging syndrome has the "answers" to the above self-evident policies and because the political system will shed crocodile tears, saying that the country will be isolated, will be disliked, will anger the powerful, will suffer the same as before, let's talk a little as to who needs whom.
This whole complex of alliances and collusions, which we call the Western World, is preparing a war (open, hybrid, or creeping) against Russia and China. The relevant operations are already in progress. In this context, any dramatic changes and upheavals in the "NATO South-East Wing" strategy are crucial. The area is already aflame. And because Greece is on fire, it is more than necessary to "belong firmly to the West". If this would ever hane to be weighed?
Secondly, the strategic stronghold of the West in the very strategic Middle East, Israel, has a single stable and reliable umbilical cord that necessarily passes through Greece. Would anyone put this given in jeopardy? Would anyone leave the fortunes of ten million Israelis at the mercy of two giant Muslim countries, Turkey of ninety million and Egypt of one hundred million?
But the beggar is a beggar because he has renounced, he has denied both, his weapons and his potential. He has been left at the disposal of those he considers powerful. The latter know, as they also know, that the only behavior towards a beggar involves constant humiliation and kicks. And not for some reason. Just so that the beggar does not get the idea that he might not deserve being a beggar. Neither our people, nor our history, but I will add, nor to these traveling theatrical troupes that pose as the "national leadership" of the Greeks, deserve such humiliation.
- Οι απόψεις που αναφέρονται στο κείμενο είναι προσωπικές του αρθρογράφου και δεν εκφράζουν απαραίτητα τη θέση του SLpress.gr
- Απαγορεύεται η αναδημοσίευση του άρθρου από άλλες ιστοσελίδες χωρίς άδεια του SLpress.gr. Επιτρέπεται η αναδημοσίευση των 2-3 πρώτων παραγράφων με την προσθήκη ενεργού link για την ανάγνωση της συνέχειας στο SLpress.gr. Οι παραβάτες θα αντιμετωπίσουν νομικά μέτρα.